racial, ethnic, and demographic control. The result is a growing trend toward criminalizing immigration, so prevalent in recent years in the United States that jurists have identified it as a new hybrid and highly unstable area of the law they ironically term "crimmigration" (NNIRR, 2010; Chacón, 2009; Moyers, 2009) . And while immigration policy is supposed to be the exclusive province of federal law, a series of agreements authorized since 1996 between U.S. federal agencies and local police precincts to conduct immigration enforcement has resulted in a policy tug of war between local states and the federal government, which parallels that between the European Union and its member states (Camayd-Freixas, 2010) .
Thus, at all levels, court interpreters formerly used to working in the neatly delineated and well regimented arenas of either immigration or criminal court now face unprecedented ethical challenges in a changing landscape suddenly marred by issues of social conflict, ethnic prejudice, and human rights. The divergent ethical duties of interpreter, officer of the court, and citizen, which were seldom problematized before-and therefore have remained unaddressed by the ethical codes of most courts and professional organizations-now all too often come into conflict.
For years now, many interpreters in the United States and elsewhere, but particularly in the states along the U.S. border with Mexico, have been confronting the ethical dilemmas of "crimmigration" on a daily basis. Without adequate guidance from their ethical codes or the concerted backing of professional organizations, they have had little choice but to quietly facilitate, as part of their work, questionable and downright abusive "crimmigration" proceedings against their own conscience, and frequently against members of their own ethnic group. Despite the high incidence of such cases, these difficult working conditions remained unreported until they were replicated in a high-profile case: the Postville, Iowa immigration raid and criminal prosecutions of May 2008.
In this landmark case, instead of simply deporting the migrants, as had been previously the norm, hundreds of indigenous and illiterate peasants from Guatemala and Mexico, who were slaving away at a meatpacking plant in Iowa, were raided and charged with the antiterrorism crime of "aggravated identity theft," in order to force them to plead guilty to lesser charges of social security and document fraud, making this an unprecedented criminalization of migrant labor (Downes, 2008) . Ten at a time, they were "fast-tracked," convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated within seven working days. It was the only mass felony prosecution in American history, indeed in the history of modern democracy since WWII. It thus set a dangerous precedent: one month later, the U.S. actions in Postville emboldened the European Union to authorize the detention of undocumented migrants for up to 18 months, a measure that drew sharp criticism from most of the Third World (Amnesty International, 2008: 3) .
Thirty-six federally certified Spanish interpreters participated in the Postville prosecutions. Ten could only stay the first week; so another ten were brought in as replacements.
I was one of the 16 who worked through both weeks of the proceedings. We were contracted by the federal criminal court in Iowa under false pretenses for a secretive mission that was supposed to have been a "continuity of operations exercise." But when we arrived at the heavily guarded cattle auction fairgrounds turned detention compound and field court to begin work, we learned that it was in fact the largest immigration raid in U.S. history.
Each day of the proceedings, I saw a new irregularity, compared to my experience of 23 years working for federal courts across the country. Like pieces of a puzzle, these irregularities compounded to produce wholesale injustice at the other end of the judicial conveyor belt. In individual interviews with detainees, it became apparent that most of them did not even know what a social security number was, and therefore were not guilty of intent crimes as charged.
Held without bail, hundreds of workers were forced to plead guilty and accept a five-month sentence, or spend many more months in jail waiting for a dubious trial, while their families starved. The magnitude of the suffering was life changing. By simply doing my job and following my code of ethics to the letter, I, like the rest of the participants, had facilitated the wrongful demise of hundreds of impoverished workers and vulnerable families. I further knew, from my communications with court personnel, that Postville was a pilot operation to be replicated at scale across the country. The moral burden was too heavy to ignore.
At the end of the proceedings, I discharged my reporting duties to the court by sharing my concerns with a senior judge. I was surprised to see that the judge himself was angered and disgusted at the entire operation. He had no sentencing discretion and was powerless to administer justice. I was witnessing the breakdown of the separation of powers, one of the pillars of our democracy. Months later in a public interview, this exemplary judge, the Hon. Mark W.
Bennett, criticized the Executive for forcing the hand of the Judiciary in the Postville case. He called the proceedings a "travesty" and expressed his moral sentiment stating: "I was ashamed to be a U.S. District Court judge that day" (Argueta, 2010).
I returned home with a heavy conscience. I proceeded to research government documents in order to understand the broader legal and political implications of the events. Once the cases were closed and I was no longer under contract with the court, I wrote a full report, which I emailed to judge Bennett and my interpreter colleagues in the case, who could verify my findings (Camayd-Freixas, 2009) . With the judge's knowledge, my colleagues sought my permission to share my report with their contacts in the legal profession. Within two weeks, counsel for the U.S. House of Representatives asked me to testify at a congressional hearing investigating the Postville raid and prosecutions (USHR, 2008) . Meanwhile, lawyers across the country urged me to make my report public. At that point, I had fully discharged my obligations to the court as an interpreter, and was now prepared to act my conscience as a citizen, entitled to freedom of speech by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. I wanted the legal community and the press to scrutinize the case, in the interest of restoring the integrity of our justice system. Evidently, the scope of these matters went beyond personal or professional considerations. I urged journalists to conduct a full investigative report, but that would take months. Instead, the article "An Interpreter Now Speaking Up for Migrants"-with the sensationalist and erroneous caption "Breaking the code of confidentiality"-appeared on the cover of The New York Times (Preston, 2008a) .
In the following months, I was so consumed with the Postville relief effort, helping journalists with interviews and reports, lobbying labor unions, faith groups, NGOs, and government officials for a moratorium on raids, and advocating for immigration reform, that I hardly had time to follow up with my profession. I received many letters of support from lawyers, judges, and interpreters, spoke at law schools and bar associations, and received humanitarian awards from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry, and other organizations. I was even elected "Linguist of the Year" by Inttranet Global Translators Network, based in Rouen, France, but our own professional associations in the United States remained silent and mired in controversy (Bierman, 2008) .
Some critics suggested that I should have withdrawn, citing conflict of interest. But by the time I realized the judges had no sentencing discretion, the case was already over. Not one of the 36 interpreters withdrew, even though many expressed disapproval about the proceedings.
One even commented: "Even if we all withdraw, nothing keeps them from bringing in noncertified interpreters." The conflict, real or perceived, did not prevent us from discharging our professional duties to the letter. Every single interpreter, independently, arrived at the same personal decision to stay the course. It was the right decision both from an ethical and a professional standpoint. To withdraw in a high-profile case is tantamount to making a public statement, which could affect the outcome and violate the principle of non-interference, the cardinal rule that the interpreter must not influence the outcome of the case. Yet this cardinal rule, which underlies the code of ethics and the interpreter's oath of accuracy and impartiality (whose purpose is precisely non-influence), is everywhere implied but nowhere expressly articulated in our ethical codes-this being the first lack to be remedied as part of the deontological revision I propose below.
Moreover, it was the court, not I, that had acquired a conflict of interest, by the manner in which it accommodated the pre-approved prosecutorial strategy (Preston, 2008b) . New evidence now confirms that the Chief Judge secretly participated in the planning of the raid and prosecutions almost a year in advance of the operation (Black, 2010) . The court had failed to live up to the same standard of impartiality required of the interpreters. Impartiality, as defined in judicial codes, requires avoiding any situation that might give even the mere appearance of bias.
It applies to all neutral officers of the court: to wit, judges, clerks, and interpreters (JCC, 1994: 17; NCSC, 1995: 202) . Various critics have argued that abridgments of due process in the case compromised the professional ethics of all participants (Greenberg & Martin, 2008; Andrade & Orr, 2008) . Working for a conflicted court turned everyone into agents of the prosecution. I had to interpret coerced guilty pleas I knew were perjured. All the participants were pressed into playing along, while fraud was perpetrated upon the court as an institution. Doing my job quietly (Sibirsky & Taylor, 2010: 34-36) . Division and confusion reigned, signaling that a revision of ethical codes and the role of professional organizations is overdue.
As matters stand, if any colleague confronts abuse and decides to exercise professional discretion and report the violation, that interpreter will stand alone. This is unacceptable, inasmuch as a core role of professional associations is precisely to support the mission of the individual interpreter. We need not wait until the next mass prosecution. I have corresponded with many interpreters who confront similar abuses, and feel disenfranchised, afraid, and alone.
In a changing landscape marked by the erosion of democratic principles and constitutional protections, including abuse of process, arbitrary detention, intimidation, and torture, interpreters are often forced to become tacit facilitators of such abuses 
Interpreting in a Changing

Preexisting Rules (Deontology)
Any rigorous review of professional codes of conduct should go back to fundamentals:
the main ethical traditions that constitute the foundation of all modern ethical codes. Since ancient times, philosophers have attempted to formulate a set of rules to capture our moral intuitions in all situations. After centuries of failing to bridge the distance between codification and reality, we understand that no code can ever fully achieve that. Instead, three complementary ethical systems have been handed down through the ages: Kant's "categorical imperatives,"
British "consequentialism," and the Confucian "ethics of virtue." Each has limitations, as well as useful implications for interpreter ethics.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) provides the philosophical basis for modern ethical codes-a system of a priori "categorical imperatives" or preexisting rules and prohibitions to be universally observed. The term "a priori" or preexisting rules refers to ethical tenets that pre-date the particular situation to which the rules are supposed to apply. Although Kant placed a central emphasis on "will" or "intention" as a determinant of an act's morality, such states of mind are not observable to others, and in law require an overt act. The fact that codes of ethics cannot practically provide for the "intentions" of an act suggests that the status of "categorical imperatives" accorded to preexisting rules and codes is a distortion of Kantian ethics. Kant never advocated following rules blindly nor proposed any particular set of rules. By the same token the non-observable quality of intentions is a limitation in the applicability of Kantian ethics, which therefore cannot support any set of rules being construed as absolute or categorical. For Kant it is intentions that count, not rules or consequences.
Yet undoubtedly, a good set of rules will serve us well in most circumstances, and is particularly necessary for the beginning professional. But sooner or later, experienced interpreters will confront the inherent limitations of such purportedly "universal" codes. This is bound to happen whenever codified, preexisting rules are tested against new social, political, and legal realities.
Inherent limitations in ethical codes belong to three categories: 1) grey areas in reality which fall "in between" ethical tenets, obscuring their interpretation and applicability; 2) situations where different tenets conflict or lead to divergent conclusions; and 3) bias in the way the code originated and evolved.
Regarding bias, consider that interpreter codes in the United States originated with the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, at a time when ad hoc interpreters were the norm, and administrators sought to suppress "non-professional" behavior. Even after "professionalization"
(if such historical achievement could be pinpointed), the desire to control new hires continues to perpetuate this "supervisory" bias. That is, our codes originated and evolved as administrative tools designed to empower supervisors, not professional interpreters.
Researchers find that "institutions sometimes negotiate the rules sensitively with their members and take account of their experience and values, but more often they impose these codes from the top down, as a response to some legal or public relations concerns" (Baker, 2011: Ch.8). Thus "professional responsibility" came to imply "not rocking the boat" even if it means "ignoring broader moral standards in society" (Cheney et al., 2010: 15; Cf. Hennessy, 2008) . The resulting codes seek "compliance with regulations" more than "elevating behavior" or "being morally responsible"-which sometimes may require "resisting an order, going public with private information, or leaving a job or career altogether" (Cheney et al., 2010: 153) .
Today, "model" court interpreter codes in the U.S. (Federal, California, and NAJITavailable at www.CourtEthics.org) are still unrevised supervisory codes. They continue to treat interpreters as though they were still ad hoc outsiders to the judicial process, denying them any professional discretion as participants in the proceedings. This is profoundly at odds with rules 604 and 702 of the Federal Criminal Code and Rules (1989) , which grant the interpreter the combined status of expert witness and officer of the court-roles whose scope of responsibility transcends interpreter cannons (Dueñas et al., 1991: 160) .
Cannon 6 of the federal code illustrates this bias: "Interpreters shall not publicly discuss, report, or offer an opinion concerning a matter in which they are or have been engaged, even when that information is not privileged or required by law to be confidential." This restriction obstructs constitutional freedom of speech and professional advancement through publication, and is neither required nor expected from any other officer of the court. For example, a court clerk in the Postville case published his own criticism of the proceedings, without raising any eyebrows (Moyers, 2009 ). In contrast with this double standard, the most evolved code in our
profession, Massachusetts Code of Professional Conduct for Court Interpreters of the Trial
Court, deliberately states: "A court interpreter shall not discuss publicly, report or offer an opinion concerning a matter in which he/she has been engaged and while such matter is pending." Given that the cases were closed even to appeal, my report was in absolute conformity with the Massachusetts Code. I knew this from the outset, since I trained at Boston Superior Court (1980 Court ( -1986 where the Massachusetts Code originated.
Moreover, we will see later that the Massachusetts Code is the only one to offer guiding principles, the fundamental values that the rules are designed to protect. Precisely because other codes do not recognize any room for professional discretion, they see no need to offer principles for guiding the interpretation and applicability of rules that interpreters are expected to follow mechanically. Therefore, such codes suffer from all three shortcomings outlined above:
inapplicability to grey areas, conflicting tenets, and bias. In contrast, the Massachusetts code clearly states its guiding principles before issuing any rules or prohibitions. I will return to this under "Virtue Ethics," but now I wish to emphasize that instead of serving to educate and empower interpreters, rigid supervisory codes actually foster what ethical philosophers call "rule worshiping"-following rules blindly, regardless their consequences or rationales (Cf. Hennessy, 2008 ).
The following case illustrates the limitations of ethical codes and the potential consequences of rule worshiping. Years ago I interpreted at a trial where lawyer and interpreter were actually co-defendants, U.S. v. Carbone and Mejía (1999) . The lawyer, through the interpreter, had coached a witness in preparation for a previous trial, and it backfired. Arguably, the interpreter followed the code of ethics to the letter, interpreting the lawyer's coaching without interfering. Yet both were charged, convicted, and sentenced with the same level of culpability, for subornation of perjury. This case shows that the interpreter is a facilitator. If you interpret during the commission of a crime, interrogation by torture, or rights violations (as I did in Postville), you have facilitated the abuse-as a full-fledged accomplice. The myth that the interpreter is not a participant is, and has always been, untenable.
Ethical codes do not exist in a vacuum. Over my years as a trainer, I developed with the help of students and colleagues the following "compliance priority": The Law, Employer Policy, Interpreter Code of Ethics, and Your Conscience. Before making an ethical decision, the interpreter must fully consider all of these sources of authority, without singling out any particular tenet or making any one principle absolute, to the detriment of other considerations.
Finally, when searching your conscience, consider the foreseeable consequences of your actions:
"What is the worst that could happen if I speak out and if I don't, and can I live with the consequences?" This method has the advantage of properly incorporating rules, consequences, and the virtues or rationales behind the rules, into an ethical decision-tree. One or more factors should clearly justify your choice. In the absence of clear and distinct indication, do nothing.
Consequentialism
The question of consequences remains an insurmountable argument against "rule worshipers" and preexisting rules. According to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) an act is moral only if its foreseeable consequences bring "the greatest happiness to the greatest number."
Consequentialism is the ethical side of British empiricism and utilitarianism, which together constitute the philosophical foundation of Anglo-American Common Law, linking ethics, justice, and democracy. In contrast, authoritarian rules impose a code of silence and acquiescence, predicated upon the system's presumed infallibility.
Consequences, however, are not always clear-cut or easy to foresee, let alone quantify.
How do we compute happiness and suffering? Such are the limitations of consequentialism, and the reason why it cannot be relied upon exclusively, any more than preexisting rules.
In the Postville case, I had to contend with the question of consequences: What if I didn't speak out? But here, the magnitude of the events made the computation easy: a community devastated, hundreds of parents wrongfully convicted, hundreds of children at stake-and this was just the pilot operation. The thought of it happening again in a democracy was horrifying.
On the other hand, my report brought legal scrutiny upon the case, and helped public defenders better prepare to represent their clients. Mass prosecutions ceased and worksite raids subsided.
My collaboration in an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court resulted in a unanimous ruling to disallow the use of identity theft charges against unknowing migrants-protecting seven million undocumented workers in the United States from frivolous prosecution (NYU, 2008; CamaydFreixas, 2009b) . Personally, I continue to interpret for federal courts, attorneys, and prosecutors, and to advocate for due process and human rights. Our fallible system works, because it allows us to challenge it.
Moral Sentiments and Meta-Ethics
As a complement to consequentialism and ethical rationalism, Scottish moral philosopher and political economist Adam Smith (1723-1790) wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), the ethical foundation for his best-known work, The Wealth of Nations (1776). "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner" (I.I.1). For Smith, the moral sentiments of sympathy (empathy), compassion, and benevolence are primary to any rationalization of ethics. Thus, the "utility" of our judgments is "plainly an afterthought, and not what first recommends them to our approbation" (I.I.33).
Two main principles in Smith's theory are of import to court interpreter ethics. First there is the notion that the proper evaluation of ethical judgments requires, more than just rules and rationales, the participation of moral sentiments, which in turn require presence or affective immediacy. That is, we cannot fully evaluate a situation unless "we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner." Thus, presence and/or immediacy are required for the formation of empathy and moral sentiments, which are essential to judgment. "As we have no
immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation" (I.I.2).
This quality of empathy is central to the interpreting process. The interpreter must convey
what is said but also how it is said, that is, the state of mind of the speaker. This is only possible by identifying morally and culturally with each speaker. Further, the interpreter's bilingual and bicultural competence provide for a high degree of cultural and historical familiarity with each speaker. This places the interpreter in a closer moral proximity to others than any other actor in the judicial process. If we add to this the oath of accuracy and impartiality, we can readily see that no one is in a better position to judge than an interpreter who was there.
Yet inevitably, those who were not there will pass judgment upon those who were, on the basis of abstract preexisting rules, which-having no direct experience or affective immediacy to the attending facts and moral sentiments-they can only apply hypothetically and mechanically, as though rules applied infallibly and admitted of no possible exception. This underscores the importance of recognizing the role of professional discretion in ethical decision-making for those interpreters who are immersed in a particular situation of conflict.
The second of Smith's principles that concerns us is that of the primacy of moral sentiment, the idea that our moral intuitions or "gut feelings" about right and wrong come first, and only then do our rationalizations follow. This prefigures modern social psychology's "attribution theory of emotions," which suggests that we perceive complex situations preconsciously as a physiological reaction, before subjecting them to discursive reasoning. We then attribute those physiological reaction to fear, love, anger, or other emotions depending on cues from the environment (Fónagy, 2001: 108) .
For me that moment of reckoning came during our individual attorney-client interviews at Newton State Penitentiary in Iowa. We were to explain to the Guatemalans the government's coercive plea agreement, and why it was "in their best interest" to sign it. That is when we interviewed Isaías, an illiterate peasant from the highlands of Chimaltenango, who had traversed Mexico on foot and crossed the desert into the United States, in order to toil grueling hours at the Postville slaughterhouse for meager wages, hoping to pay his debts and send a few pennies home, where his four children, wife, sister, and mother survived on his remittances. For him the government's plea bargain meant, "sign here or your family starves." We determined beyond doubt that he had no idea what a social security number was. With this, the entire case of the prosecution, based on identity theft and document fraud, crumbled. He was patently innocent of all charges, and yet there was nothing the attorneys could do for him or the other 300 workers.
He distrusted his attorney and interpreter, for he rightly saw us as part of the same system as his captors'. "God knows you are all doing your job to support your families," he said between bouts of tears, "and that job is to keep me from supporting mine." As I translated those words, I saw the attorney recoil, speechless. She took the truth exactly as I did: like a kick in the gut. The only difference is that, as an interpreter, I was not free to show any emotion. Beyond this point any ethical deliberation was mere rationalization, "plainly an afterthought."
In recent decades, the theory of moral sentiments has resurged in the field of "metaethics," which includes questions on the psychological foundations of ethics and the manner in which we arrive at ethical decisions. Slote (2010) argues that sentimentalism based on empathy can deal with significant aspects of ethical decisions that rationalism commonly tends to ignore. Sibirsky and Taylor (2010) are among the first to apply the concept of meta-ethics to interpreter conduct, and particularly to my role in the Postville case. In their subchapter on "Ethics, Meta-Ethics, and Postville," they define meta-ethics as the "process of thinking about moral values, without participating in them or acting upon them"-that is, while maintaining a neutral role. They warn, however, that a negative aspect of meta-ethics, construed as "going above and beyond ethics," consists of "crossing over into unethical conduct" when moral sentiments "compel courtroom interpreters to refuse to perform their duties […] or to disrupt a proceeding" (34-36). In some instances, however, the difference between withdrawing on moral grounds and refusing to perform one's duties may be a mere matter of semantics. an interpreter in the Postville case, and as a citizen afterward, what I was doing was not metaethics so much as "applied ethics"-which is fully normative. That is, my actions were normative in the sense that they establish an important precedent, which I believe empowers individual interpreters and strengthens the profession.
Virtue Ethics and the Massachusetts Code
Instead of a set of prohibitions, Confucius (551-479 BC) with his "ethics of virtue" prescribes the enlightened pursuit of positive values (Sim, 2011) . Clearly this is the most lofty and advanced of the ethical traditions, but it is devoid of accountability. We cannot justify our actions by simply claiming virtue, any more than good intentions. Without observance of rules and consideration of consequences, even our most virtuous acts might appear self-righteous.
Therefore the values to be pursued in virtue ethics must not be individual values, but those sanctioned by a collective body; hence the importance of professional organizations and the success of the Massachusetts code. When confronted with grey areas, conflicting ethical tenets, and unclear consequences to our impending acts, the ethics of virtue can come to our rescue, provided that our guiding values are those of our society and our profession.
The key, then, to the success of the interpreter code of ethics of the Massachusetts Trial Courts is that it begins precisely by outlining its guiding principles. "These standards seek to: Coming from this tradition, I was fully aware of my duty to protect these values, both as a citizen and as an interpreter-there no longer being any contradiction between both roles.
These, after all, are the fundamental values, based on law, which the rules of every ethical code for judiciary interpreters are designed to protect. After this preamble, the actual cannons vary little from those of other codes. The difference is that by outlining the guiding virtues of the profession, there can be no question as to the proper interpretation and application of the rules.
Yet in order to empower the interpreter, as an officer of the court and as a citizen, in the pursuit and protection of these values, the Massachusetts code departs in one important way from other codes, by specifically preserving the interpreter's public voice and the citizen's constitutional right to freedom of speech: "A court interpreter shall not discuss publicly, report or offer an opinion concerning a matter in which he/she has been engaged and while such matter is pending." The duty of non-interference effectively ends with the disposition of the case. The opposite, the imposition of perpetual silence, actually hinders the protection of fundamental values.
These same principles apply to all officers of the court. Indeed, only by affording the interpreter the same rights and privileges as other officers, may the same duties be demanded, for such is the compact between the court as an institution and its officers. Only then will the court interpreter be recognized as a legal professional and not as an ad hoc outsider.
In sum, the positive discretionary guidance in the preamble of the Massachusetts code reflects the highest standards of the legal profession as a whole. As such, the language of the President's Commendation I received from the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers echoes that of the Massachusetts code, the Civil Rights Act, and the Bill of Rights. It proudly reads: "For distinguished service as an interpreter, courage in bearing witness to injustice, eloquence in giving voice to those who cannot adequately speak for themselves, and outstanding service in advocating for the rights of all persons, however humble, to be treated equally under the law."
As a sign of the coming of age of our profession, it is fitting for our organizations to take stock of the Massachusetts code and align their principles and resolutions accordingly. In addition to the values of meaningful access, constitutional rights, due process, and equal protection, which are specific to the legal field, organizations should adopt timely universal resolutions: for the individual's duty to advocate for human rights; against the use of children as interpreters; against facilitation of brainwashing and interrogation by torture*; and for the national duty to protect interpreters and their families serving our country in theaters of war.
Ultimately, no code of ethics shall hinder the exercise of our highest professional virtues: the respect for human dignity and the pursuit of justice.
*Note: The American Psychological Association has longstanding resolutions against facilitating brainwashing and interrogation by torture. The sciences and academia have strict rules regarding research with human subjects. And the list goes on. By no means do such resolutions compromise the impartiality or integrity of professional organizations. On the contrary, they align the organization's public discourse with its fundamental values, which are presumed to also be those of its members. 
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